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ABSTRACT 
The exploitation of a non renewable natural resource, such 
as petroleum or mineral ores, is analyzed in a stochastic frame­
work with price uncertainty. The market setting may be either 
monopolistic or competitive. We demonstrate that the rate of 
extraction varies directly with the resource owner's willingness 
to accept risk. Risk preferring owners use the resource more 
rapidly than risk neutral owners, who in turn deplete the resource 
more rapidly than risk averse owners. It is also seen that the 
usual practice of increasing the discount rate to account for 
risk induces a ni.ore rapid rate of resource use, when in fact a 
slower rate of depletion is desired. 
ATTITUDES TOW ARDS RISK AND THE OPTIMAL 
EXPLOITATION OF AN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE 
by 
Tracy R. Lewis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent concern over the adequacy of future supplies of 
certain energy and mineral resources has stimulated much interest 
about factors affecting the rate at which non-renewable resources 
are used up. A num.ber of authors including Heal et al. (1974), Lewis 
(1974), Long (1975, 1974), Schmalensee (1975), Smith (1974), 
Stiglitz (1975), Vousden (1973), and Weinstein and Zeckhauser (1975) 
have described the patterns of resource depletion occurring under 
different assumptions about resource demand, market structure, the 
rate of time discount, the possibility of backup resources, changes in 
technology and so forth. 
One factor, yet to be analyzed, which is the subject of this 
paper, is the effect on depletion rates of random variations in the 
market price of resources. For example, owners of petroluem 
reserves such as the OPEC l block are faced with price uncertainties 
res�lting from changes in the demand for oil, in the availability of 
2 
substitute supplies, and in national energy conservation programs. 
In what follows, we present a theoretical analysis comparing extraction 
rates of an exhaustible resource for owners who are risk preferring, 
2 
risk neutral, or risk averse regarding variations in the returns from 
extraction. The resource whether it be oil, gas, minerals, etc., 
is owned by a single fir·m or cartel in the case of OPEC. 3 The analysis 
allows for situations where the firm operates in a competitive market 
with price perceived as given, or in a monopolistic market where 
price is sensitive to the quantity of the resource sold by the firm. 
In either case price uncertainty exists in the form of random 
additive shifts in the demand schedule facing each owner. The firm 
presumes to know the total resource stock available for extraction. 
However, in each period it must choose the amount of oil to pump or 
the quantity of ore to extract khowing only the probability distribution 
for prices at which the resource can be sold. 4 We assume the firm 
always sells all of its output at the prevailing market price. This is 
because opportunities for storage or arbitrage, in which distributors 
buy and store resources when prices are depressed and sell their 
inventories when prices rise, are presumed to be already reflected 
in current prices. 5 
Complete contingency markets are presumed not to exist, so 
that the owner is necessarily subject to some risk in the returns from 
the resource. We asswne the rate of extraction is chosen in each 
period to maximize the present value of expected utility, with 
preferences for risk bearing being reflected in the form of the 
owner's utility function. 
In the analysis to follow, we dernonStrate that the rate of 
pumping or extraction varies directly with the owner1s willingness 
to accept risk, Risk preferring owners use the resource more rapidly 
than risk neutral owners, who in turn deplete the resource more rapidly 
than risk averse owners. This is analogous to the static results derived 
by Leland (1972) and Sandrno (1971) who find 'that risk averse firms 
produce less than risk neutral firms, Also, -increasing the discount 
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rate to account for risk, a common practice in the public investment 
literature, is shown to induce a more rapid rate of resource use when 
in fact a slower rate of depletion is desirable. 
This section is concluded with a specification and description of 
our model. In section II optimal extraction programs are derived and 
compared for owners with different risk bearing attitudes. The method 
o f  risk adjusted discounting is shown to differ markedly from the pro­
cedure of capturing risk in the form of the utility function. A short 
swnmary and discussion of our results is presented in section III. 
Our analysis will be done in discrete time under stationary 
conditions. Let qt be the quantity of the resource extracted or pumped 
from the ground (in the case of oil) during time period t, and let St 
be 
the physical size of the available resource stock at the beginning of the 
t th time period. (Time arguments will be omitted where no confusion 
exists). For a given amount of extraction the per unit market price 
for the re source, p(q ) is random with t 
;(q,) = p(q,l + 
-n
t (A. l )  
where 'flt is a random variable which is identically and independently
distributed over time with density function ¢(';\t). 6 For the case where 
the owner is the only local supplier of the resource we assume 
p1 (q) < 0, otherwise p(q) = Pin the competitive situation. 7 Consistent 
with other analysis assuming additive stochastic demand by Mills (1959) 
and Zabel (1972), we restrict ':n to be non negative to avoid the 
possibility of negative prices. Expected demand equals p(q) + �
where E{;;) = �. Instead of (A. l) we might have specified a 
multiplicative stochastic demand, although the additive and multi­
plicative assumptions are equivalent in the competitive case where 
p (q) = p. As Zabel {1972) points out, models with multiplicative 
demand· are intrinsically more difficult to work with. This is also 
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true in our analysis. For example, in the monopoly case with 
stochastic multiplicative demand, we have been unable to unambiguously 
determine the effect of preferences for risk bearing on resource 
use. 
In each period, the owner incurs a cost of extraction, C(qt} 
which is non random with 
c > 0, c > 0 
q qq -
This is a simplified specification in that vv·e are abstracting from 
possible effects of resource depletion on extraction costs. 8 
(A.Z) 
In choosing the optimal extraction program. we asswne the 
owner selects qt in each period to maximize the present value of
expected utility from extraction profits given by 
m 
';;:-' t � maximize G B EU (TT( qt
})
qt t=O 
B I I + p 
subject to the constraint on resource availability 
m 
so - L: 
t=O 
qt:::. 
0 and q ,S > 0 t t - p > 0
where profits ';(q) = qp(q) - C(q) and p is the discount rate. We 
asswne the utility function, u. has a positive first derivative with 
(I) 
(2) 
U11 {> 0, = o. < 0) according to whether the owner is r.isk preferring, 
risk neutral, or risk averse. To make the analysis relevant we make 
one additional assump�·ion that the resource is exploitable� that is 
EU'[O];:; (0) > 0
q 
II, OPTIMAL EXTRACTION PROGRAMS 
(A. 3) 
The necessary condition for the ma.Ximization of (1) subject to (Z) 
5 
is 
t � [ t � ] B EU1n - A< 0 and B EU'n - A q 
q - q t 
0 (3) 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource 
availability constraint in (Z). Clearly A is positive by (A. 3), and 
(A. 3) and (3) together imply qt> 0 whenever St> O. A has the usual 
interpretation of being the marginal value of an add,ition to the resource 
stock. Equation (3) simply states that along the optimal path increases 
in expected current returns are exactly offset by decreases in future 
returns resulting from current 1:esource use, 
Condition (3) is also sufficient for a maximum. of ( l )  if 
� � z � ] E U11rr + U1n < 0
q qq 
(4) 
Sufficient conditions for (4) to be negative are that; be strictly 
concave in q, and that firms be risk neutral or risk avers� (U" � 0)
or that TI' be linear in q and the firm be risk averse. We shall 
assume TI is strictly concave in q and that (4) is negative for all q 
(even with U11 > 0). In Appendix. A we also obtain the same results 
as presented here when (4) is not negative for all q, which may 
� 
result when U11 > 0, or when U11 � 0 and TT is linear. 
To simplify the analysis, we introduce the following notation. 
Let f. p n a ][ p n a ] f,p n a] Lq t' q t' q t , S t' S t' S t , and LT , T , T represent 
the amount of extraction at time t, the amount of the re source 
re1'!1aining at time tp and the time at which the resource is finally 
exhausted according to optimal extraction programs for a risk 
preferring, risk neutralp and risk averse owner respectively. We 
wish to establish that: 
Pro2osition 1:
and 
Pro2osition 2:
If Ta> Z 
n a 
q t > q t 
n a 
q t .'.:'.q t 
n a 
q t 
< q t 
then 
t < t1 
for t = t' t' E (0, Ta) 
t > t1 
Sn <Sa t t for t E (0, T
a
) 
Tn< Ta 
h . n a S ot e rw1se_ q 0 = q 0 = 0 
if Tn > 2 
q
p 
> q
n 
t t 
p n 
q t .'.:'. q t 
q
p < q
n 
t t 
then 
t < t• 
for t = t' 
t > t' 
t' E (0, Tn) 
sP < s'' t t for t E (0, T
n
) 
Tp < Tn 
otherwise q
p 
0 = q
n 
0 = s0
or in other words that risk preferring owners deplete in.ore rapidly 
6 
(Sa) 
(Sb) 
(Sc) 
(6a) 
(6b) 
(6c) 
than risk neutral owners, who in turn deplete more rapidly than 
risk averse owners. 9 
7 
For the discussion here, we will assume that extraction 
horizons are at least two periods long. The results for single period 
horizons are demonstrated in Appendix B. To establish Propositions 
1 and 2 we need to derive some additional properties about optimal 
extraction programs. First, 
d 
sign 
dq 
Err 
EU� 
t ,_ - - u-2 '- }EU TT ETT 
. 
- ETT (EU TT + EU TT ]
= sign q qq q 9 99 
(EU'TT )2
(7a) . q q 
{- r - -1 
-2 
-} 
TT EU'TT - EU1En - EU11n ETT 
- . qg 9 g q q . - sign ,..., 2 (EU'TT ) 
• q 
fi[ - � ] -2 -) sign \JEU'rrq - E.U'Enq + EU11r q ETTq 
(7b) 
(7c)
= sign � [u• - U'(;:f'(�))] [;:f'q - Enq] + EU'.;:;q2ErrJ (7d) 
< > 
= 0 as U11 = o. > < 
Noting that ETI = TT qq qq 
" ' 
= p (q) + 2p (q) - C and factoring we 
(7e) 
obtain (7b) from (?a). 
q qq 
1...., 2 Eq. (7c) follows since TT < 0 and (EU TT ) > 0. 
- - ' qq q 
We obtain (7d) by noting that Err = 1T (T]) and by adding and subtracting 
' ..... I\ ..... q q 
U (TT('T1))Err from the r. h. s .. of (7c). Eq. (7e) then follows immediately 
,q ,,..,,. ...., ..... < 11 < 
since [U - U (TT(�))](TT - ETT ) >= 0 for all q as U = 0.q q > 
Second, from equation (3) we obtain, 
d 
dt qt < 0; for qt > 0
� 
) EU1n
q
(qt + T 
EU"nq
(qt) 
l - for q O BT t' qt + '!"' ,-> 
independent of attitudes for risk bearing. 
Using (7)-(9) we can establish 
Lemma 1:
if n a q t' .::::_ q tt for some t', then 
n a n q < q for all t > t' unless q t t t 
a 
q t = 0 
and 
Lemma 2� 
if q
p < qn for some t1, thent' - t1 
q
p < qn for all t > t1 unless qp = qn t t t t 0.
n To prove Lemma 1 assume contrary to (10) that q , 
t 
q
n > qa for some t > t1 where all q's are positive. 
< qa 1 and - t 
t - t 
is strictly concave in q, 
- [ n ] - [ a ] a-"ra ] Errq q t' � Errq q t' = a.EU 'rrq lq t' 
Then since iT 
8 
( 8) 
(9) 
( 10) 
( 11)
(12a) 
where Ci is some positive constant, and Ua is the risk averse owner's
cardinal utility function. IO· By (7), (8) and (12a)
- a En
9
(q t') 
EU
alTiq(q
a'
t) 
- a ETT
q
(q t) 
= a > ai....... a EU TTq (q t)' 
and therefore with a little rearranging we obtain 
' a - a <>'EU TTq(q 't
) 
,...., a ...., n 
> ETT (q ) > ETT (q t) q t - q 
It follows from (12a)-(!2b) that 
E';9 
[qn t1
Errq [q
n
t') 
- l = 
Eng [q
n
t) - E';:;g [q
n
t') 
E';:;q 
[
qn
t,)
< 
o,[Eua,;:;g [q\) - EUa,;:;g[ q\11 
a� [ a )a.EU 'TTq q ti 
a� [ a ) EU 1TT9 q t 
a� [ a )EU 1TTq q t' 
l 
which implies a contradiction of (9) if we let the risk neutral 
utility function, Un(;;:') = ;;:'. Thus q
n
t < q
a
t• The result in (11)
for q
p 
t and q
n
t can also be established using the same proof as 
above. 
9 
( l2b) 
( 13) 
readily. 
From ( 10) and ( 11), the results in Propositions 1 and 2 follow 
First with respect to (S), we note that qa 0 
< qn 0. Otherwise 
00 
if q
a
0 � q
n
0• (IO) implies L 
t=O 
00 
q
a
t > L 
t=O 
qnt which can1t occur 
if both the risk neutral and risk averse programs satisfy the 
resource availability constraint with equality. With qa 0 < q
n 
0 
(Sa) is an immediate consequence of (10). Condition {Sb} follows 
from (Sa) and the fact that 
00 00 
L: q\ =L: 
t=O t=O 
n 
q t' Finally, (Sc) 
follows directly from (Sb). The same proof as above can be applied 
to Proposition 2 as well. 
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When risk preferences are captured in the form of the utility 
function, we see that the rate of resource depletion decreases as 
we move from risk preferring to risk neutral to risk averse owners. 
On the other hand, if we maximize the stream of expected profits 
discounted by a risk adjusted interest rate (higher discount rates 
corresponding to greater risk aversion) we find that resource depletion 
is more rapid for risk averse than risk neutral owners and so on. 
This is the message of 
Proposition 3;
Tp > 2 
qp
! 
> qp t t 
qp
' < qp t - t 
qp
' < qp t t 
5P' < 5P 
t t 
Tp
' < Tp
for 
for 
otherwise p
' 
q 0 q
p 
0 = so. 
' ' 
The quantities [Sp t' 
p 
5P t]' [q t' 
t < t1 
t = t1 t' E (0, Tp) 
t > t1 (14) 
tE(O, Tp) 
' 
qp t], and T
p 
, Tp] represent the stock
remaining at time t, the extraction rate at �ime t, and the time when 
the resource is exhausted according to the bptimal extraction 
programs corresponding to discount rate p' and p respectively, with 
p1 > p. The proof of Proposition 3 follows directly from (3) and (4)
and the resource availability constraint. 
1 1  
In accounting for risk preferences through the discount rate, 
we assume uncertainty enters as a time compounding phenomenon. 
Ho\vever, in our model, variations in returns are proportional 
to the extraction rate, q, and independent of time. In this context 
it is not surprising that altering the discount rate to account for 
11 
risk preferences is inadequate. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
According to our analysis, the rate of resource use is affected 
in rather predictable ways by the risk bearing attitudes of the 
resource owner. Whether these results hold in a more general 
context where extraction costs depend on the amount of the resource 
available, and where possibilities for storing the resource are 
explicitly considered requires further investigation. 
Besides this several other topics for further research come 
to mind. One is the effect on extraction rates of increased price 
uncertainty. There are many factors tending to distablize the world 
oil market. These include uncertainties about existing and future 
supplies of energy, the development of energy saving technology, and 
even the social and political climate of the energy consuming countries. 
Such uncertainties are bound to add to existing variations in oil prices. 
In the case of domestic resource suppliers it would be helpful for 
policy purposes to examine the effect of resource use of various kinds 
of extraction taxes. The level of total income including extraction 
profits and other 11outside11 income is likely to affect the risk 
preferences of owners. Therefore, lump sum taxes and profit 
taxes on resource extraction which are normally perceived as being 
neutral with respect to extraction rates will undoubtedly affect 
resource use under conditions of uncertainty. 12 In that income is 
reduced, we would expect the imposition of these taxes to cause a 
decrease in the rate of extraction assuming that owners are risk 
averse and display decreasing absolute risk aversion as defined 
by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964). However, we suspect that the 
impact of these taxes must be examined on a specific case by case 
basis, We have found that the simple conditions imposed on our 
model are too general to derive unambiguous results on the effect 
of taxation. 
IZ 
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APPENDIX A 
We wish to show that the results in (6) hold even if equation 
(4) is not negative for all q, a sufficient condition for maxirni�ation 
in equation (1), Equation (4) will be non negative if (1) n is linear 
in q and U11 � O, or possibly if (2) un > O. For the first case, 
with n linear if follows that q
p 
0 = q
n 
0 :::: s0 and the resource is 
depleted as rapidly as possible. 
In the second case clearly' two possibilities exist; either 
Tp = 1, or Tp > 1. If Tp = 1 the results in (6) follow immediately. 
If Tp > 1 then qp must satisfy equation (3), otherwise there would t t1 ,...., p t ,...., p exist some t and t' such that B EU1n {q ,) < B EU'n (q ) with q t q t 
q
p
t' and q
p
t > 
0, which is non optimal since we can decrease q
p
ti 
and increase q
p
t on the margin to increase the total value of the 
program. However� in the body of the paper we have already derived 
the results in {6) for the case where condition (4) yields a true 
maximum. in (1).
APPENDIX B 
In (5) we wish to show that if Ta = 1 and q0 
a 
n a and q0 = s0• Let us assume to the contrary that T 
Then (3) implies: 
and 
� n ETTq
(q0 ) 
� n = BETTq(q1 
) 
EUa'n (So) 
> BEUa' n  (0).q - q 
Since s0 
> q0 
n (4) implies 
= S then Tn = I 0 
n I but T > I. 
(Bl) 
(B2) 
a"' 0 a....., n 
14 
EU 'TT (S ) < EU 'TT (q0 ) • q q (B3) 
Because Ua is a cardinal utility index, we can choose some constant
o. such that
EU'TI (q n) = q 0 
� n a.ETTq(q0 
) 
� n = a.BETTq(q1 
) . 
Condition ( 7) implies 
a....., n "' n BEU 'TTq(q l ) > a.BErrq(q1 ). 
However, combining equations (B3)--(B5) we obtain 
0.1"' a 1"' n "' BEU TT (0) > BEU TT (qi ) > EU'TT (S0) q q q 
(B4) 
(BS) 
(B6) 
which contradicts equation (BZ). Thus it follows that Tn = I 
whenever Ta = 1. The same type of proof can also be employed in 
(6) to show that Tp = 1 whenever Tn ::: l. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. OPEC refers to the 110rganization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries. 11 It is composed primarily of oil rich Middle East 
countries and was established in 1960 as a cartel to influence 
world petroleum prices. 
2, For example President Ford's 11energy independence11 program 
is likely to effect OPEC1s oil revenues substantially. However, 
the exact impact of the program will in the long run depend on 
the social, political and econo1nic climate in the United States, 
3. For a comprehensive discussion of OPEC and the world 
petroleum market, see Adelman (1974}. 
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4. We are assuming a free market in natural resources, one without 
direct government price regulation. 
5. The extent to which resource storing can dampen oscillations 
in price will depend on the cost of maintaining inventories. When 
these costs are high, as in the case of petroleum, storage may 
not be feasible. For an explicit treatment of resource exploitation 
in which storage is possible, see Lee and Orr (forthcoming). 
6. For notation purposes a variable with a tilde over it is a 
random variable, and f = df/dx. 
. x 
E(*) represents the expectation operator.
7. In the competitive case, an alternative assumption is that firms
perceive prices as given in a particular time period, but that
expected price may rise or fall throughout time. For example, 
unless substitute materials exist, competiti-ve firms may expect 
prices to rise over time as resource supplies are diminished. 
This possibility is to be examined in a forthcoming paper by the 
author. 
8. We might have also assumed there are positive fixed costs to 
extraction although this assumption would not alter the nature
16 
of our results, Schmalensee (forthcoming) provides an interesting 
analysis of the effect of fixed costs on resource use.
9. Ta, Tn, and Tp may be infinite if TT (0) = 00. Ta will also be 
' q infinite if U (0) = 00. 
10. Because we are dealing in a von Neumann-Morgenstern 
expected utility framework, all utility functions are necessarily 
cardinal. The value of a is arbitrary and will depend on the
scaling of Ua. 
11. See Prest and Turvey (1965) on this point. 
12. See Peterson (1972), pp 20-22,
17 
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